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Conclusions and recommendations
In its review of the implementation of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, the EU has recognized the key shortcomings of the current scheme of 
ﬁ nancial assistance to Eastern Partnership countries. These are: insufﬁ cient 
incentives for reforms and the need to apply the “more for more” principle 
more consistently; limited impact of available funds due to their small 
volume, annual budgeting and thematic fragmentation; and inadequate 
mechanisms for engaging civil society actors in planning, implementing and 
monitoring the assistance. Interviews carried out in the Eastern Partnership 
countries with ofﬁ cials, experts and non-governmental organization activists 
corroborate these ﬁ ndings, leading to several recommendations that could 
help make EU assistance a more effective tool for realizing the Partnership 
policy objectives.
Budget support that was supposed to encourage systemic reforms in the 
Eastern Partnership states has largely failed to reach that objective. Review 
of the actual priorities of disbursed funds in 2008-2011 reveals that ﬁ nancing 
was scattered to numerous thematic areas, and virtually no common themes 
could be identiﬁ ed in the budget support among the beneﬁ ciary states. 
Reducing the number of priority issues is needed to give focus to both 
bilateral and multilateral aid. EU would do well to identify as primary those 
two or three sectors that are crucial for progress in the ongoing integration 
processes, such as the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement and 
visa liberalization dialogue. Multilateral aid could concentrate only on those 
issues in which several beneﬁ ciary states have expressed interest, and cases 
of successful cooperation should be rewarded with dedicated funds for 
follow-up initiatives. As with bilateral assistance, EU might take into account 
the greatest interest among Eastern Partnership states in collaboration on 
economic issues and on visa and border management, applying this form 
of assistance to transfer the experience of the reform leaders to countries 
interested in sectoral transformation.
The European Commission’s proposals, simplifying the process of 
assessment and in effect reducing the time needed for programming assistance, 
are a step in the right direction towards lessening the bureaucratic burden. 
Introduction of the Single Support Framework and of multiannual budgeting 
perspective should enable the EU to run longer and larger infrastructural 
and technical assistance projects. In addition, raising the threshold beyond 
which reallocation of funds would need to be approved by the Member States 
should make the assistance more responsive to the changing needs on the 
ground. However, the proposed mechanisms for increasing transparency 
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and improving monitoring of assistance are not realistic as the national 
parliaments and audit bodies lack independence to carry out controlling 
function vis-à-vis the governments. On the other hand, mechanisms need to be 
established for obligatory inclusion of non-governmental organizations into 
the process of planning and verifying assistance objectives, and conditions 
should be created for the NGOs to be able to monitor allocating and disbursing 
funds (in the ﬁ rst place, by enforcement of the right to public information in 
the national legislations).
Launch of the Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility and of the European 
Endowment for Democracy indicates that support to civil society as an 
agent of democratization has become a substantive item on the ENPI agenda 
following years of relative neglect. These new instruments, complemented 
by the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and the Non 
State Actors and Local Authorities thematic programme, have the potential 
to form a powerful package, able to strengthen civil society organizations 
organizationally and enable them to step up their advocacy efforts. EIDHR 
priorities are set forth without the need to seek approval from the partner 
countries, while the EED is an independent foundation which can also 
maintain distance from European institutions. 
However, for the level of absorption of these funds among CSOs to increase, 
a number of barriers, identiﬁ ed by non-governmental activists and experts in 
the course of application, implementation and reporting the EU assistance, 
must be tackled. IPA research, carried out in Ukraine in late 2011, shows that 
especially CSOs from the more peripheral regions found the EU to be the 
least friendly donor in terms of locating information, clarity of procedures 
and conditions of application.  Recommended measures include: accepting 
applications in the local language, more vigorous information campaigns 
clarifying the procedures, allocating a part of funds for institutional capacity-
building (including organizational audits) and the introduction of multi-annual 
budgeting as well as opportunities for regranting.
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Introduction
This report reviews the experience of implementing EU assistance in 
the region of the Eastern Partnership in the current ﬁ nancial perspective 
(2007-2013), suggesting ways in which it can be made into a more effective 
instrument for realizing political priorities of cooperation. It takes into 
account an assessment of the existing tools for the European Neighbourhood 
Policy issued by the European Commission and the European External 
Action Service in 2011. Finally, it offers a critical review of the proposal of a 
new neighbourhood ﬁ nancial instrument, highlighting the need to tackle 
three problems with the current system: excessive thematic fragmentation, 
inconsistent application of the “more for more” principle and insufﬁ cient 
volume of aid for civil society. These questions are all the more pertinent as 
negotiations are under way on the new EU budget for 2014-2020 and by the 
end of 2012 a stalemate has been observed in the progress of several Eastern 
Partnership states in reaching declared Eastern Partnership objectives, in 
particular democratization, rule of law and civil liberties.
The text draws on the combination of desk and ﬁ eld research undertaken 
by experts of the Institute of Public Affairs in 2011-2012. We wish to thank all 
the experts who provided their kind contribution in the course of the research, 
in particular: Jacqueline Hale of the Open Society Institute Brussels, Hrant 
Kostanyan of the Centre for European Policy Studies, Olga Schumylo - Tapiola 
of Carnegie Europe, Annar Mammadi of Election Monitoring and Democracy 
Studies Centre, Leonid Litra of IDIS Viitorul, Victoria Gumeniuk of Centre UA 
and Alex Oprunenco of Expert Group. Moreover, valuable insights have been 
collected from various ofﬁ cials representing EU institutions and the Member 
States as well as from consultants to the European Commission in the 
countries of the Eastern Partnership.
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I. OVERVIEW OF EU ASSISTANCE TO EASTERN 
    PARTNERSHIP STATES
1.1. Tension between the objectives of EU assistance to countries 
of Eastern Partnership
Since 2007, a single instrument, the European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI), is used to ﬁ nance the EU’s activities in the 
Mediterranean region, Russia and six states of Eastern Europe and the 
Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). This 
step brought under one umbrella the various geographical programmes (in 
particular, MEDA for the Mediterranean region and TACIS for Russia and the 
Eastern neighbours)  and allowed for an increase in the total allocation by 32% 
up to 12 billion EUR for the period of 2007-2013.
Relations with countries in its neighbourhood demonstrate the 
tension between two sets of objectives of the EU’s aid: development and 
democratization. When the volume of bilateral and multilateral assistance 
is combined, the European Union emerges as the world’s largest donor, 
accounting for over half of all the ODA inﬂ ows in countries such as Belarus, 
Ukraine, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt or Syria. In its assistance to countries in the 
neighbourhood the EU is at the same time trying to effect a transformation 
effect, serving as a model of peaceful coexistence of states, multi-level 
democratic governance and economic integration. Pursuit of one set of goals 
(development) may hamper realizing the other (transformation) as happens in 
the case of setting the agenda for cooperation.
The development framework is based on the principle of ownership, which 
mandates that the target country sets the agenda and requires alignment of 
donor strategies to those favoured by the beneﬁ ciary.  This approach was 
announced in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005 and reiterated 
in the Accra Agenda for Action of 2008, which called for strengthening country 
ownership of development. However, it became clear as early as the previous 
ﬁ nancial perspective (2000-2006) that some of the Union’s eastern neighbours 
were interested in an enhanced format of cooperation that would provide 
for approximation of their legal and institutional systems to the acquis 
communautaire, enabling them to gradually take advantage of the EU’s 
freedoms, especially tapping into the free market and gaining free movement. 
These objectives were subsumed into the Eastern Partnership framework, 
launched in May 2009, to cover six states in the eastern dimension of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy.
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Already in June 2006 the EU declared in the Communication on 
strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy that additional support 
within ENP should be made available to states willing to undertake reforms, 
while further incentives would be needed to encourage non-reformers. 
Following efforts of the German Presidency, the EU issued in December 2007 
the document “Communication: A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy,” 
which introduced the principle of positive conditionality, deﬁ ning the ENP 
as “a partnership for reform that offers «more for more»” so that a partner 
country’s deeper commitment to reform should result in the EU’s response 
in the form of fuller political and economic cooperation, complemented by 
“ﬁ nancial and technical” support.
The shift towards the ‘more for more” principle was reﬂ ected in a change in 
the ﬁ nancing scheme within ENPI. While in the 2000-2006 ﬁ nancial perspective 
assistance was based on projects in which the European Commission 
contracted the implementation of projects to various intermediaries (non-
governmental or international organizations and consultancies), since 2007 
direct budget support involving transfers to state budgets of partner countries 
has been used for bilateral assistance. The new approach was designed to 
maximize country ownership of the agenda by seeking agreement with the 
beneﬁ ciary on the priority areas of reform. Moreover, it was expected that 
bilateral assistance would become more efﬁ cient thanks to elimination of a 
large part of the transaction costs.
Another initiative that was designed to promote the “more for more” 
principle and encourage systemic reforms in the Eastern Partnership 
countries was the launch of a dedicated instrument rewarding performance 
towards democratization, rule of law, solid regulatory environment and socio-
economic reforms. Governance Facility was allocated 50 million EUR per year, 
and in 2007-2008 40 million EUR went to Ukraine while 17 million to Moldova. 
However, after a felicitous start, the instrument was eventually suspended 
as the progress towards the required reforms slowed down while the target 
countries found this path to be too complex. For instance, as many as 52 
criteria could be taken into consideration to judge Ukraine’s progress, and 
soon it turned out that some of those—such as ﬁ ght against corruption or 
promoting an independent judiciary—proved to be stumbling blocks in the 
country’s implementation of reforms. The case of the Facility became in fact 
typical for a large part of the EU’s mechanisms for support used within ENPI, 
which suffered from excessive fragmentation of thematic areas, inﬂ exible 
arrangements for reallocation of funds and non-transparent monitoring 
mechanisms.
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1.2. Fragmented bilateral assistance within ENPI
Launch of the ENPI under the 2007-2013 ﬁ nancial perspective was supposed 
to bring greater coherence to the EU’s activities in the neighbourhood by 
pursuing both bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation with partner 
countries. However, this happened only to a limited extent. Firstly, the ENP 
builds upon existing agreements between the EU and partner states as short- 
and medium-term priorities of political and economic reforms are still agreed 
jointly and included in bilateral Action Plans. Secondly, bilateral assistance in 
the form of direct support to governments constituted nearly three-quarters 
of the ENPI funding in the period of 2007-2010 (Fig. 1).
Institutional arrangements for disbursing and monitoring bilateral 
assistance represent another barrier to ensuring coherent funding. The 
greater part of national allocations committed in the period of 2007-2010 
was direct budget support, ranging from 50% in Azerbaijan, 60% in Armenia, 
and 70% in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The funds are spent in accordance 
with the public ﬁ nance principles of a given state as long as three basic 
conditions are met: there must exist a national development/reform plan, 
stable macroeconomic policy and a system for public ﬁ nance management. 
Monitoring of the progress in fulﬁ lling of the conditions is carried out by a 
monitoring committee consisting of ofﬁ cials from the EU and from the partner 
country.
Budget support is the preferred form of assistance used by the European 
Commission in the Eastern Partnership region. A combination of general 
and sectoral aid is made available. Under the ﬁ rst type, funding is provided 
for a broad range of reforms planned by the third-country government for a 
given period of time, for instance, implementation of the association agenda 
or action plans. The second type is sector budget support – only reforms in a 
given selected sector are eligible for support, e.g., reform of the energy sector 
or health sector.
Fig. 1.
Allocation of ENPI 
funding, 2007-2010
Source: Data 
of European 
Commission, 2010
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The Eastern Partnership initiative was hailed as a strategic vision that 
would help advance the partner countries in their efforts to get closer to 
the EU and strengthen their institutional capacity for absorption of funds. 
However, review of the actual priorities of disbursed funds in 2008-2011 reveals 
that ﬁ nancing was scattered to numerous thematic areas, thus reducing 
opportunities for using this instrument as an incentive for fundamental 
systemic reforms. In three out of the ﬁ ve target countries, ﬁ nancing went to 
at least four areas, and virtually no common themes could be identiﬁ ed in the 
budget support among the beneﬁ ciary states (Table 1). Such fragmentation not 
only limits the allocations to individual ﬁ elds, some of which (such as energy 
or environment) require signiﬁ cant outlays, but also reduces the impact that 
more focused aid might have.
Country Thematic areas
Commitments 
(2007-2010) 
million EUR
% funds 
disbursed 
(2008-2011)
Armenia
Vocational reform;
Justice service 
Multi-sector program related to  negotiations on 
Association Agreement and DCFTA
65 47
Azerbaijan
Justice, 
 Agriculture and administrative,   Energy,
40.5 27
Georgia
Public ﬁ nance management;
Regional development, 
Criminal justice,  
Emergency response –  implementation of action 
plan
174 74
Moldova
Economic stimulation in rural areas  
Water supply and sanitation – large systems
Environmental strategy
Health sector
147.5 77
Ukraine
Trade 
Energy 
Environment 
Transport 
Border management
344 67
The impact of EU budget support has been limited as in three of the ﬁ ve 
targeted countries it represented merely a fraction of GDP, ranging from 
0.03% for Azerbaijan, 0.1% for Armenia and 0.2% for Ukraine. The share in GDP 
was actually indicative of a capacity for absorption that proved to be lower 
than expected. In fact, only slightly more than a quarter of committed funds 
were disbursed in Azerbaijan and less than half of the allocation was used by 
Armenia in 2008-2011. It is signiﬁ cant that absorption was the highest in the 
two countries (Moldova and Georgia) that displayed greater commitment to 
Table 1.
Budget support to 
Eastern Partnership 
states
Source: Data 
of the European 
Commission, 
October 2011
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administrative reform and enjoyed higher levels of civil liberties and lower 
rates of corruption.1
Contrary to the original expectations, the Eastern Partnership priorities 
(among them economic integration and visa regime liberalization) have 
overall not taken precedence over the development priorities (as seen in Table 
1 above). The bulk of the budget support to Moldova and Ukraine addressed 
socio-economic issues. For instance, in Moldova, the country with the best 
absorption of funds, the EU concentrated on the reforms of the health and 
environment sectors, rural areas and the system of water supply. In Ukraine 
support was given for reforms of the energy, environment and transport 
sectors. In contrast, only a small share of aid was committed to the Partnership 
priorities in the ﬁ eld of governance and rule of law (such as the reform of 
the courts, public administration and ﬁ ghting corruption). Judiciary reform 
was only featured in the three states of the Caucasus while reform of public 
ﬁ nance gained prominence only in aid to Georgia. Although three states of 
the Partnership are engaged in dialogue with the EU on liberalization of 
visas, questions of border management were included in bilateral assistance 
priorities in Ukraine only.
Impact of the budget support is hard to estimate in view of its low scale 
and short timespan. The European Commission’s report points to some local 
successes in the implementation of budget support in the Partnership region. 
New institutions were set up—such as twelve vocational training centres 
in Armenia and the State Agency for Renewable Energies in Azerbaijan, and 
regional development agencies were set up in cooperation with Denmark and 
Sweden. Assistance granted for the reform of the judiciary in Georgia helped 
raise the age of minors’ criminal liability from 12 to 14 years of age. In turn, 
support for the health sector in Moldova made it possible to cover 80% of the 
population with mandatory health insurance.
1.3. Limitations of multilateral assistance
While the Eastern Partnership largely continues the framework of 
assistance applied in the European Neighbourhood Policy, it introduces 
mechanisms for multilateral cooperation. Emphasis has been placed on issues 
related to democracy, good governance and stability, economic integration 
and convergence with European Union policies, energy security and contacts 
between people. To facilitate these political objectives in the dialogue with 
the partner countries, high-level meetings were scheduled, involving heads 
of states (every two years) and ministers of foreign affairs (every year). In 
addition, platforms for contacts among members of parliament, diplomats 
1  According to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Georgia is at 68th place, Moldo-
va – 105th, Armenia – 123rd, Belarus –127th and Ukraine and Azerbaijan at 134th (out of 178). See http://www.
transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results
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and civil society representatives were set up. Four multilateral platforms 
were established to deal with crucial issues of cooperation (democracy, good 
governance and stability, economic integration and convergence with EU 
policies; energy security; contacts between people) (Fig. 2).
The multilateral cooperation scheme was launched with an additional 
dedicated 600 million EUR. However, the effectiveness of this funding is limited 
due to a similar host of factors as with the bilateral funds. Division of the funds 
into so many thematic areas makes it difﬁ cult for the EU to ensure effective 
implementation and monitoring. Dispersal of funds among so many areas 
reduces the volume available to individual projects and in effect prevents 
launching larger follow-up projects to pioneer initiatives. Use of funds also 
varies according to the thematic area, reﬂ ecting uneven interest of individual 
states in cooperation. Interest is highest in cooperation on the economic 
platform (the greatest number of speciﬁ c panels) as well as visa liberalisation 
and border management. For instance, two groups of states have emerged to 
share experience on association agreements and agreements on the Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (Ukraine and Moldova; Georgia and Moldova). 
Additionally, as a result of the initiative of the Polish Presidency, sectoral 
cooperation in economic and visa issues has been developed. During the 
Presidency, a number of ministerial meetings were organized, for instance on 
issues related to economy, infrastructure, customs service, statistical systems 
and food safety.
Fig. 2.
Eastern Partnership 
multilateral 
cooperation scheme 
(2013-2020)
EASTERN PARTNERSHIP 
MULTILATERAL FUNDING
€600m
Bilateral dimension
Comprehensive Institution 
Building
€175m
Pilot regional development
programmes
€75m
Multilateral dimension
4 policy platforms
Platform 1: Democracy, good 
governance and stability
Flagship Initiatives:
- Integrated Border 
Management Programme 
(€44,5m)
-Prevention of, preparedness 
for, and response to natural 
and man-made disasters 
(€12m)
Panel on fight against 
corruption
Platform 2: Economic, 
integration and convergence 
with EU policies
Flagship Initiatives:
Environmental governance 
(€12m)
Small- and Medium-Size 
enterprise (€57m)
Panel on Trade
Panel on Environment and 
Climate Change
Platform 3: Energy security
Flagship Initiatives:
Regional energy markets and 
energy efficiency (€41m)
Platform 4: Contacts between 
people
- EaP Culture Programme 
(€12m)
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1.4. Assistance to civil society
Although support to civil society is a priority in several bilateral Action 
Plans with Eastern Partnership countries and an objective of the entire 
initiative, this issue has so far received a small share of ENPI funding. This 
only began to change as the EU responded to the Arab Spring by launching 
the Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility in September 2011, a component 
of the Instrument that would express “shared commitment to respecting 
universal values, international human rights standards, democracy and the 
rule of law.” In November 2012, after some delay, funding was provided for 
the European Endowment for Democracy, which complements the Facility as 
an independent foundation.2 However, an increase in funding for civil society 
and in defence of human rights will not bring about the desired impact 
unless such barriers to access to funds as insufﬁ cient information and over-
bureaucratization are tackled.
In 2007-2009, the share of funds allocated to the area of “Government and 
Civil Society” in all six Eastern Partnership countries totaled 65.5 million EUR 
(Fig. 3). This represents a mere 7% of the national allocations within ENPI. 
Even this modest funding was not easily accessible for non-governmental 
organizations. An analysis of grants disbursed in that line that was carried 
out by the Institute of Public Affairs showed that only one-ﬁ fth of the funds 
reached NGOs. Strengthening of democratic institutions or protection of 
civil rights received relatively little attention, while the bulk of the assistance 
went to the improvement of the condition of groups threatened with social 
exclusion (e.g., refugees, disabled people, people living in rural areas, women) 
and to voters’ education and monitoring of elections.
2 European Commission, Memorandum, “The European Endowment for Democracy”, Brussels, 12 November 
2012, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1199_en.htm
Fig. 3.
Volume of external 
EU assistance under 
line “Government 
and Civil Society” 
(in millions EUR)
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Non-governmental organizations in the Eastern Partnership states ﬁ nd 
EU assistance hard to access and absorb as the interviews conducted by IPA 
experts in regions of Ukraine show. When asked to rank EU assistance against 
other donors, recipients found it to be the worst in terms of ease of locating 
information, clarity of procedures and conditions of application.3 Results of 
the research indicate ﬁ rst of all that the EU assistance offer fails to take into 
account the low institutional capacity of NGOs in these countries. Few civil 
society organizations are able to handle projects with budgets exceeding 
100,000 EUR, which are typical for EU-funded programmes. More organizations 
could take advantage of this assistance if some funds were dedicated to the 
enhancement of their institutional capacity and if larger organizations could 
be allowed to engage in re-granting. Smaller entities from outside major cities 
also ﬁ nd application procedures to be daunting, requiring proﬁ ciency in 
formal English and experience of handling donors’ requirements. Interviews 
in some regions of Ukraine show that the coverage of information on the EU’s 
available support to CSOs is uneven, leaving out some areas. 
Insufﬁ cient involvement of civil society stands in the way of realizing 
some of the fundamental objectives of EU assistance: adjusting aid priorities 
to local needs and ensuring participation of representatives of groups in need 
in planning, implementing and monitoring of aid. Unfortunately, the format of 
talks on the planning of assistance priorities in budget support has so far left 
out non-governmental organizations, rendering them unable to provide input 
into the Action Plans. The need for establishment of mechanisms for formal 
consultations with civil society organizations in the scheme of bilateral EU 
assistance is clear given the absence of institutional solutions providing for 
genuine dialogue between the partner countries’ governments and the third 
sector. 4  Non-governmental organizations have so far not been consulted in 
the process of monitoring of disbursed assistance either, which results in low 
transparency and at times a mismatch between local needs and the priorities 
of programmed assistance.
Those organizations that do decide to seek EU ﬁ nancing are faced with the 
difﬁ culty of ﬁ tting their needs to match the objectives of several programmes 
which were designed independently from one another and whose procedures 
differ. Non-state actors may either seek assistance from the dedicated 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), concentrating 
on human rights, electoral issues and development of free media) or from the 
Non State Actors and Local Authorities thematic programmes, which offer 
3 The results of the research Strengthening the capacity of Ukrainian NGOs to absorb international assistance 
– review of institutional gaps and needs for intervention, November 2011. See I. Bekeshkina, P. Kazmierkiewicz, 
Making Ukrainian Civil Society Matter, IPA: Warsaw 2012.
4 At the same time, whenever the EU chooses to do so, it proves that it can be effective in stimulating the 
dialogue between the government and the non-governmental side. For instance, the importance of involving civil 
society was reinforced in the EU’s strategy of exerting pressure on the Ukrainian government to hold a series of 
consultations with civil society organizations in 2010 so that the input from the third sector would be considered 
in the national strategy of environmental protection.
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support to raise organizational capacity of NGOs. The important feature of 
EIDHR assistance is that it can be implemented without the agreement of the 
partner governments and is open to organizations and individuals working 
in defence of “human rights, justice, the rule of law and the promotion of 
democracy.”5 
Apart from these two special instruments, CSOs are eligible for EU 
assistance to realize sectoral activities under the Development Cooperation 
Instrument (covering such Partnership objectives as migration policy, 
environmental protection or food safety) and the ENPI (cross-border and 
regional programmes).6 EU research programmes, cultural programmes and 
youth exchange schemes are, to some limited extent, available to beneﬁ ciaries 
from the Partnership region.7 What is important to note is that, as part of the 
multilateral cooperation introduced by the Eastern Partnership, some very 
limited funds are designated for programmes concerning non-governmental 
cultural cooperation.8
The review of the neighbourhood policy in 2011 highlighted the need to 
boost support to democracy on both the southern and eastern ﬂ anks. Two new 
initiatives were launched since then, one speciﬁ cally in response to the Arab 
Spring (the Civil Society Facility) while the other (the European Endowment 
for Democracy) was proposed by Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski 
and taken up by High Representative Catherine Ashton. With the budget of 
22 million EUR carved out of ENPI for 2011-2013, the Neighbourhood Civil 
Society Facility aims at involving non-state actors in the reform process in the 
countries of the neighbourhood through three dedicated components.  In the 
ﬁ rst component, the EU proposes trainings and exchanges of good practice 
to enhance their effectiveness as drivers of change on the national level. In 
the second component, the EU is committed to involving CSOs in multilateral 
projects as a supplement to existing thematic programmes. Finally, the third 
component seeks to engage non-state actors in implementing bilateral 
programmes.9
Unlike the Facility, which is an evolutionary development of ENPI seeking 
to engage NGOs into existing programmes (both bilateral and multilateral), the 
European Endowment for Democracy10 is intended to target those to whom 
the assistance had so far been unavailable for procedural or political reasons: 
“journalists, bloggers, non-registered NGOs, political movements (including 
5 More on EIDHR at the website: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/ﬁ nance/eidhr_en.htm
6 See more in: E. Kaca, P. Kaźmierkiewicz, Eastern Promises: Supporting Civil Society in the Eastern Partnership 
Countries, IPA: Warsaw 2010.
7 European Union Programmes and Instruments facilitating mobility between the EU and Eastern Partnership 
Countries – and other related cooperation programmes http://eapmobility.pl/static/documents/Publication_EP_
ENG.pdf
8 Programme for EP culture has been made available, amounting to 8.4 m EUR.
9 European Commission, Memorandum, “EU Response to the Arab Spring: the Civil Society Facility”, Brussels, 
27 September 2011, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-638_en.htm
10 European Commission, Memorandum, “The European Endowment for Democracy”, Brussels, 12 November 
2012, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1199_en.htm
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those in exile or from the diaspora), in particular when all of these actors 
operate in a very uncertain political context.” The Endowment took some time 
to become operational, but the European Commission’s seed allocation of 
6 million EUR, announced on 12 November 2012, should provide impetus to 
this much-awaited initiative, ﬁ lling the glaring gap in the system of assistance 
in place so far. The budget is admittedly small, but it should be sufﬁ cient for 
the activities that are initially planned: “conferences, seminars, publications, 
networking events, training courses.” Another novelty is the fact that the 
Endowment is to operate as a private foundation, established in Belgium, and 
independent from the EU so that its objectives and activities could remain 
autonomous. Time will tell to what extent the EED will manage to evolve into 
a recognizable entity whose mission will complement the EU’s existing tools, 
such as EIDHR or the Civil Society Facility.
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II. ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SUPPORT 
    AND PLANNED INITIATIVES
2.1. Evaluation of support within the Eastern Partnership framework
Although direct support has been available to governments of Eastern 
Partnership states for ﬁ ve years, it is not easy to evaluate its impact.  As experts 
and non-governmental organizations stress, no information on the conditions 
of granting this assistance and on its effects is publicly available. Enforcement 
of the right to access to public information in the Partnership countries is 
limited as seen in the case of Ukraine where the government administration 
regularly refuses to give information about assistance to non-governmental 
organizations. Moreover, interviews conﬁ rm that information is not readily 
available from the European Commission, which appears to encounter 
problems in collecting information on the progress of the states receiving this 
assistance. Even Member States receive only very general progress reports 
during the meetings of the Committee of the European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument.11
So far, budget support has only been evaluated in a comprehensive 
manner in a report of the European Court of Auditors covering Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia.12 The Court pointed to several shortcomings in the 
way the EU funds were disbursed. Firstly, the report found the impact to be 
limited, suggesting the need to deploy a wider range of aid activities including 
technical assistance and support for the non-governmental sector. In addition, 
it found the two-year period of programming to be too long, which delayed the 
actual implementation of projects. Moreover, the Court criticized the process 
of selecting priorities for the dominant position of the European Commission 
and insufﬁ cient involvement of the local stakeholders. The recommendations 
were for the most part upheld by the Council, which requested that the 
Commission should consider them in its review of the neighbourhood policy 
(see below).13
The Court’s criticism of the system of evaluating the areas of support has 
been echoed in the interviews with experts working in all the Partnership 
11 The Committee consists of representatives of the Member States and provides opinions on the activities of 
European institutions under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
12 European Court of Auditors, Is the new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument successfully 
launched and achieving results in the Southern Caucasus?, Special Report no 13, 2010
13 Council conclusions on Special Report 13/2010 by the European Court of Auditors concerning the results 
of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) in the Southern Caucasus 3086th FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS/TRADE Council meeting Brussels, 13 May 2011  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/
pressdata/EN/foraff/121979.pdf
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countries. In their view, the process is not optimal as the EU has an inordinate 
inﬂ uence on the selection of the areas of support. EU ofﬁ cials and EU-
commissioned experts play the central role in the assessment of the partner 
states’ capacity for sectoral reforms. In the course of interviews, objections 
were raised to the current system of evaluations prepared by external EU 
experts. The monitoring is carried out as part of the meetings between ofﬁ cials 
from the EU and the ministries of a given country. The EU Delegations in the 
Partnership countries have very few employees dealing with analysis of the 
political situation in a given country, making it impossible to carry out regular 
monitoring. One area of concern is many experts’ lack of thorough knowledge 
about the context of the situation in a given country, as in most cases they are 
hired on short-term contracts. Local stakeholders are also wary of what they 
perceive as the experts’ reluctance to offer critical assessment. 
The European Commission has also acknowledged the  shortcomings of 
its system of monitoring the progress in implementation of reforms. Until 
2011, assessment was carried out by the EU at the level of projects and 
published in the form of Progress Reports. This type of assessment did not 
provide a systematic and comprehensive assessment of progress made by the 
countries towards the overall Partnership objectives.Thus, as a step towards 
greater application of the “more for more” principle in bilateral funding, the 
European Commission in its review of the ENP supplemented its methodology 
of country evaluation with ﬁ ve criteria covering the area of democracy and 
good governance. Among the proposed criteria, the Commission listed free 
and independent elections; freedom to form associations, freedom of speech 
and assembly and freedom of media; independent judiciary and law-making 
and the right to fair trial; ﬁ ghting corruption; security and enforcement of law 
with respect to sectoral reforms (including police) and democratic control 
over the armed forces. The Commission is also planning to use the indices 
World Bank Governance in a more systematic way, as well as perhaps the 
Economic Intelligence Indicator and the reports of independent organizations 
monitoring progress in the process of democratization and good governance, 
such as for example, Transparency International. This methodology will be 
presented to the Member States and will be subject to consultation with the 
non-governmental sector in 2012. 
2.2. Incentives for reforms in the current ﬁ nancial perspective
The use of a single ﬁ nancial instrument, ENPI, for the two regions of the 
EU’s neighbourhood has come under criticism for failure to spur the partner 
countries to undertake comprehensive reforms of their governance and 
to respond to the interest of some states in closer integration with the EU. 
The EU Member States that had been instrumental in launching the Eastern 
Partnership initiative, Poland and Sweden, proposed that the ENPI should 
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be divided into two parts, one for the Mediterranean and the other for the 
Eastern neighbourhood.14  The European Commission has been sceptical about 
division of the instrument, being concerned that any change might provoke 
a debate among the Member States as to the reallocation of funds between 
the beneﬁ ciary states and between the two regions. The Commission is not 
expected to favour the establishment of a separate instrument as it upheld 
the unity of ENPI in its review of neighbourhood policy in 2011.
Another avenue for ensuring that the ﬁ nancial framework serves to 
facilitate strategic objectives of the Eastern Partnership could be the 
harmonization of priorities of various neighbourhood funding programmes 
with those of the Partnership Platforms. Multilateral cooperation could be 
stimulated if various ﬁ nancial tools could be used by partner states for the 
realization of their strategic objectives. However, in many cases although the 
thematic scope of certain bilateral and multilateral programmes overlaps, 
current procedures make reallocation of funds time consuming and politically 
difﬁ cult, requiring the consent of Member States. For instance, a signiﬁ cant 
rise of funding for multilateral cooperation could be achieved if such activities 
could be funded from the bilateral cross-border cooperation programmes and 
the Regional Programme East,15 which together account for around one-ﬁ fth 
of the ENPI budget (approximately 930 million EUR). Currently, however, the 
priorities of the Regional Programme East are incompatible with those of the 
Partnership thematic platforms while the Cross-border programmes are not 
consistent with the multilateral platforms of the Eastern Partnership.
The shift from project-based support to transfers to national budgets in 
the current budget perspective was supposed to encourage systemic reforms 
in countries of the Eastern Partnership. However, the current system fails to 
give the European Commission instruments for exerting effective pressure on 
the beneﬁ ciaries. This is evident ﬁ rstly in the arrangements for selecting areas 
of assistance and secondly in the practice of allocating and withdrawing 
funds.
The reform areas to receive budget support are determined jointly by 
ofﬁ cials from the EU and from the relevant Eastern Partnership countries. 
Thus, effectiveness of assistance crucially depends on the partner 
governments’ willingness to undertake reforms as well as their administrative 
capacity. However, precisely these issues (such as the reform of the judiciary, 
administration, public ﬁ nance or ﬁ ghting corruption) remain stumbling 
blocks between the two sides. None of the countries of the region is classiﬁ ed 
14 This proposal was presented in the letter of ministers Carl Bildt and Radosław Sikorski in October 2010, ac-
cessed at:  http://www.msz.gov.pl/ﬁ les/docs/komunikaty/list-rscb.pdf
15 See http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/2011_enpi_nip_regional_east_en.pdf
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as a free country,16 and in some cases we are witnessing a deterioration of 
democratic standards (Ukraine since 2010).17 
Even with the Commission’s drive towards inclusion of elements of 
democracy and human rights in the bilateral agenda, making the partner 
countries’ governments accountable for implementation of political reforms 
is likely to remain very difﬁ cult. So far, the eastern partners’ reluctance to 
take on explicit obligations in this area has forced the EU to avoid detailed 
formulations of the objectives of cooperation. Instead, the criteria in the 
annual Action Plans were deﬁ ned broadly, and indicators of success fell 
short of serving as measures of actual progress towards “deep democracy”. 
This arrangement, which did not set clear criteria for withdrawing funds in 
case of deterioration of democratic and governance standards, worked for 
both sides. The EU did not have to take decisions that could prove divisive 
amongst the Member States with their varying interests vis-à-vis individual 
partner governments. Strong negative assessment by a partner country could 
also be received by the EU Member States as evidence of the Commission’s 
failure to properly administer the funds. Making the conditions of assistance 
more restrictive might hurt absorption capacity or even result in the partner 
country’s refusal to use such funds.
Interviewed EU ofﬁ cials themselves admit that the ambiguous nature of 
the relations between the Union and the Eastern Partnership states (unlike 
the case of the Western Balkans, these countries have not been offered 
membership prospects) makes placing demands on them virtually impossible. 
For the time being, the eastern partners justify their unwillingness to 
undertake any speciﬁ c obligations by pointing out the lack of a more deﬁ nite 
political perspective (i.e., membership) on the part of the EU. 
In fact, the mechanisms of allocating and withdrawing funds do not serve 
as a motivating function either. The EU has not decided to terminate funding 
altogether to any of the current beneﬁ ciaries in the Eastern Partnership, 
and has only exceptionally resorted to freezing transfers. The most notable 
example was the joint action with the World Bank when a tranche of funding 
was not released in protest over amendments that the Ukrainian government 
introduced to the law on public procurement in early 2011. However, even 
that action became successful only when it was publicized in the Ukrainian 
press18 as the mere fact of freezing the funds had proved insufﬁ cient to bring 
President Yanukovych into compliance with EU demands.
Fixing allocations to beneﬁ ciaries also reduces pressure on the partner 
countries to compete for funds. As the European Commission is interested in 
ensuring maximum spending of the allocated funds so as to demonstrate to the 
16 Freedom in the World 2011, Freedom House – http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/ﬁ  w/FIW_2011_
Booklet. pdf [accessed 17 September 2011].
17 The situation in Ukraine is a subject of the IPA’s study Making Ukrainian Civil Society Matter, Warsaw 2012.
18 Y. Onyshkiv, Disappointed with corruption, EU holds up aid to Ukraine, “Kyiv Post” http://www.kyivpost.com/
news/nation/detail/98287/
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Member States proper budgetary care, the partner governments are virtually 
certain to receive the assigned amounts. A welcome change was the launch 
in September 2011 of a thematic programme dedicated to socio-economic 
development and democratic transition in the Mediterranean region. The 
Support to Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) Programme, 
with the total budget of 350 million EUR, enables the Commission to take 
swift funding decisions independent of the Member States. Such dedicated 
funds could be used by the Commission to react to political changes in the 
eastern neighbourhood as well, implementing the “more for more” principle 
to a greater extent than has been the case with the Governance Facility. 
Recognizing the success of the SPRING initiative, the Commission adopted the 
Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation (EaPIC) Programme within 
ENPI on 26 June 2012.19 The Programme is relatively small, with a budget of 
only 130 million EUR, and is not meant to replace but rather “complement” the 
EU’s ongoing initiatives in a given country. 
Considering that EaPIC is a very fresh initiative, it is too early to judge to what 
extent it will represent a qualitatively different solution from the Governance 
Facility, which was considered to have a very limited impact. However, some 
aspects of the programme give grounds for hope that it could serve as a tool 
reinforcing the EU’s push for democracy and human rights in the relations 
with countries in the eastern neighbourhood. First of all, only those countries 
that “make progress in reforms for democracy, respect of human rights and 
the rule of law” are eligible. Secondly, the prodemocracy agenda is integrated 
with sectoral support, stipulating that “support will be built up for sector 
reforms that are conducive to deep democracy and sustainable and inclusive 
development,” particularly justice, anticorruption and strengthening national 
democratic institutions. According to the Commission’s announcement, the 
success of this initiative could lead to wider application of this “more for more” 
mechanism in the overall ENPI scheme for the next ﬁ nancial perspective.
2.3. The Commission’s proposals for the shape of ENPI in the new ﬁ nancial 
perspective 
In the new ﬁ nancial perspective 2014-2020, the European Commission 
proposes to apply in a more consistent manner the “more for more” principle 
to reward reforming countries. The proposal was formulated in the joint 
communication of the European Commission and the European External 
Action Service on the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy of 25 May 
2011. The Commission proposed that decisions on the volume of allocations 
would be based on the review of the progress towards reforms in the period 
19  European Commission, Memorandum “Enhanced cooperation in the Eastern Partnership: the Eastern Part-
nership Integration and Cooperation (EaPIC) Programme”, Brussels 26.06.2012, available at: http://europa.eu/rap-
id/press-release_MEMO-12-491_en.htm
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of 2010-2012. Consequently, reformers would be rewarded with more funds to 
carry out programmes of socio-economic and institutional development as 
well as ones aiming at facilitation of mobility. Another incentive would consist 
of wider access to European Investment Bank loans and to microﬁ nancing 
(subject to more speciﬁ c criteria). 
The “more for more” principle has been reafﬁ rmed by the Council and 
set forth in the proposal for the ﬁ nancial regulation of the neighbourhood 
instrument. The European Commission proposes that in the new ﬁ nancial 
perspective the proportion of funds spent following the “more for more” 
principle should be increased to the level of 20% of the neighbourhood 
instrument budget, and that the remaining 80% should be set aside for the ﬁ xed 
national allocations. Given that the EC proposal envisioned a 40% rise in the 
neighbourhood funding, this could potentially turn the thematic programmes 
into a signiﬁ cant ﬁ nancial incentive.20 However, this proposal is jeopardized 
as serious budget cuts are envisioned in the compromise proposals, and 
an increase in the volume of ﬁ nancing for thematic programmes has been 
regularly resisted by the Member States, which seek to continue having a say 
on the division of those funds. 
Member States are not likely to oppose another Commission proposal which 
aims at matching assistance to the needs of the beneﬁ ciaries. To accelerate the 
process of programming and disbursing of funds, the Commission proposes 
halving the programming period to approximately one year through the 
simpliﬁ cation of the assessment mechanism. Under the proposal, thanks to the 
introduction of a single frame of reference for assessment (either the action 
plan or the association agenda) and reduced input from the issued opinions, 
the programming period is going to be signiﬁ cantly shortened. The proposed 
Single Support Framework is going to replace the current complex and time-
consuming system in which as many as three documents are assessed: Action 
Plans, Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes.
In turn, greater ﬂ exibility in funding allocations is expected if two other 
proposals are accepted. Firstly, adopting a multiannual budgeting perspective 
would cut the decision-making time by eliminating repetition of the current 
annual budget procedures. While the new procedure would mainly be applied 
to technical assistance, the Commission is considering other areas for its 
introduction. Absorption of funds could be additionally raised if in line with 
another Commission proposal opportunities to shift funds between lines were 
extended under the so-called Special Measures. The new scheme would raise 
the limit above which the Commission would need to seek approval from the 
Member States for any shift of funds within instruments from 10 to 40 million 
EUR. 
20 Access at  http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2011_prop_eu_neighbourhood_instrument_reg_en.pdf
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The European Commission has acknowledged the limitations of the current 
procedures for monitoring progress in the implementation of reforms in its 
plans for revising the system of budget support. In response to the European 
Court of Auditors’ criticism, it outlined a number of changes presented in 
the Communication of October 2011.21 To increase budget transparency and 
strengthen control mechanisms, the Commission proposed that beneﬁ ciary 
countries would be obliged to make  details of the assistance available to the 
public, providing “entry points” for oversight of the decision-making system. 
Another controlling mechanism would consist in the greater involvement 
of national parliaments and supreme audit bodies. Under the proposal, a 
substantial part of the budget support would go to national parliaments 
(via the central bank) under the condition that the parliamentary body (e.g., 
economic policy committee) would monitor the government’s progress in 
the implementation of reforms. Similarly, supreme audit bodies could receive 
a chunk of budget support on the condition of more vigorous and in-depth 
auditing activity. According to the Commission, the greater involvement of 
the parliaments and audit bodies should establish a system of checks and 
balances, leading to greater oversight of the disbursed aid while maintaining 
the principle of local ownership. However, this proposal appears ﬂ awed on 
two grounds. Firstly, most observers ﬁ nd the Commission’s assumption that 
these bodies would be able to effectively oversee the government’s spending 
to be unrealistic considering that neither the parliaments nor the audit bodies 
in most Eastern Partnership countries have the independence necessary to 
enable them to genuinely exercise their controlling function. Secondly, the 
proposal limits the involvement of non-governmental organizations to merely 
accessories to the Parliament’s oversight, failing to provide them with an 
independent mandate. 
A more fundamental shortcoming of the EU’s proposals is the imprecise 
deﬁ nition of the terms under which conditionality should be applied in case of 
unsatisfactory progress in reforms or their outright reversal. The Commission 
has not formulated criteria for reducing or terminating its assistance to 
recalcitrant countries, something which is particularly striking given the clear 
impasse with many Eastern Partnership states on questions of democracy and 
human rights. The Commission’s unwillingness to establish uniform criteria 
goes beyond the mere technical argument that the eastern neighbourhood 
is a heterogeneous region, encompassing countries with different political 
regimes and differing interests in closer integration with the EU. 
Interviews with EU ofﬁ cials revealed that the Commission harbours 
concerns regarding the negative consequences of a possible termination or 
reduction of funding. Citing the case of Belarus, they pointed out that it is very 
difﬁ cult to renew relations with a country after the withdrawal of assistance, 
21 Communication on future approach to EU budget support to third countries, Brussels 13.10.2011, COM(2011) 
638 ﬁ nal, access at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0638:FIN:EN:PDF
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making progress virtually impossible even in areas of mutual beneﬁ t (such as 
liberalisation of the visa regime). Another problem is that failure to disburse 
funding limits the available resources for neighbourhood assistance as the 
unspent funds are returned to the general EU budget. 
Another concern regarding the application of negative conditionality is 
the impact that such a move would have on the civil society in the Eastern 
Partnership states. Delaying or withdrawing rounds of assistance in the 
socially-relevant sectors of education or health could actually hurt the citizens 
rather than inﬂ uence the government. The case of Belarus actually suggests 
that in the conditions of frozen relations with the EU, the civil society is in an 
even more precarious position vis-à-vis the authorities as it not only cannot 
rely on external assistance for performing actions for the beneﬁ t of the public, 
but it may be a target of a negative publicity campaign. This reservation does 
not apply as much to cases where payments are delayed as a result of the 
partner countries’ failure to implement the already-concluded agreements, in 
particular in the areas of economic reforms and governance, as the successful 
pressure from the EU and the international ﬁ nancial institutions on the 
Ukrainian government has shown.
